The Grueling Struggle for Dominance: Putin's Prolonged War Against Ukraine

For a month now, Ukraine has been continuing its advance into Russian territory. One aspect is becoming increasingly clear: the Kremlin is prepared to continue the war of attrition because Vladimir Putin still believes in a victory. Hopes for a quick end to the conflict through military or economic shortcuts have so far been dashed. What began as Putin's war is increasingly turning into Russia's war, making it easier for the Kremlin to ignore the costs. The Kursk debacle is undoubtedly embarrassing for Putin; after all, it is the first time since World War II that nuclear-armed Russia has been attacked by a non-nuclear state. Nevertheless, it remains unlikely that this humiliation will lead to domestic problems for Putin, as some senior officials in Ukraine and the West have speculated. Long before the full invasion of Ukraine in 2022, deep reserves of social inertia, apathy, and the forced atomization of Russian society were the sources of Putin's power. Since then, the Kremlin has carefully cultivated these pillars of the regime while simultaneously strengthening the repressive apparatus and financially supporting the population. In the border regions that have experienced Ukrainian retaliation, support for the Russian war effort is 10-15 percentage points above the national average of about 60 percent. These regions, where thousands of people visited their Ukrainian relatives and friends before the war, now show an increasing pro-war sentiment. While this does not necessarily lead to more recruits for the army, it makes it easier for the government to persuade the Russian population to engage openly in conflict with their neighbors. For this reason, Putin is in no hurry to push back the invader at all costs. His military focus this year is on eastern Ukraine, where Russian troops are breaking through Ukrainian defense lines piece by piece. For now, the Kremlin finds it sufficient to patch the gap in the Kursk region with units from all over Russia, while the most combat-ready fighters remain in Donbas. The Russian president believes that he must reclaim as much ground as possible before winter and can deal with Kursk later. This explains why the Kremlin, despite the embarrassment, is not hastily resorting to the most powerful available means such as tactical nuclear weapons. The Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky wants to portray the invasion into Russia as proof that the Kremlin can be intimidated by force—and that the West should not fear escalation. "The naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines against Russia, which dominated some partners' assessment of the war, has collapsed," he said last month. The reality is that Putin has been able to extract a price from the Ukrainians for every setback in this war and increasingly from Kyiv's Western allies as well. Over the past two and a half years, he has conducted large-scale mobilization, launched ruthless airstrikes against Ukrainian infrastructure, and initiated a sabotage campaign in the West. In response to the Kursk incident, the Kremlin has ordered massive attacks against the Ukrainian power grid and has been terrorizing the country every night since. There will be more painful setbacks for Putin in this war as Kyiv seeks Western approval to use long-range missiles supplied by NATO deep within Russia and advances its own missile program with Western help. However, the Kremlin has enough means to respond. The most important decision currently is whether Putin will attempt a new mobilization, as Russian troops are exhausted. The manpower shortage can be addressed by an electronic conscription system introduced last year, which is set to be operational from November. After the panic and exodus that followed the partial mobilization of 2022, the new system aims to reduce public fear and make it impossible for draftees to dodge abroad. Given the determination to continue fighting in both Moscow and Kyiv, a swift victory for either side is unlikely. With diminished prospects for meaningful diplomacy in the coming months, the war will drag on even further. It remains unpredictable and increasingly dangerous. Western leaders should be prepared to stand by Ukraine for a long and painful period.